STRATFOR: The Strategic Implications of Instability in Egypt

[SolkaTruesilver]

Obligatory Link

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called on the Egyptian government on Wednesday to engage in political, economic and social reforms as part of an effort to heed to the legitimate demands of the Egyptian people. Clinton’s statement came a day after the Middle East’s largest Arab state experienced its most extensive protest demonstrations in 34 years. Unlike the unrest in 1977, these protests were not about the price of bread; rather the agitators are seeking the ouster of the Egyptian government — at a time when the regime is already in a state of transition, given that President Hosni Mubarak is at an advanced age and is ailing.

For three decades, the Mubarak government has sustained Egypt’s status as an ally of the United States and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty — a position that was realized during the days of Mubarak’s predecessor, Anwar Sadat. It was under Sadat that Cairo moved away from its opposition to Washington, which was the hallmark of the regime presided over by Sadat’s predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was also the founder of the modern Egyptian republic. The key American concern is that when all is said and done, Cairo will remain pro-Western and at peace with Israel.

It is not certain that a post-Mubarak Egypt will necessarily become hostile to the United States and Israel. But it is also not certain that status quo will be sustained in a post-transition Egypt. What exactly will happen will be based on the ability (or the lack thereof) of the Egyptian military to ensure that there are no fundamental changes in policy — regardless of whether or not the current ruling National Democratic Party is in power.

Washington realizes that the public discontent within Egypt and the region creates for a very tricky situation that the Egyptian military may or may not be able to manage. The United States cannot come out and openly oppose the drive toward democratic governance, mainly for public relations purposes. But Washington doesn’t want to be caught in a situation akin to a 1979 Iran when the Shah fell, bringing to power a regime that has emerged as the biggest strategic challenge to U.S. interests in the region.

The options for the Egyptian government are to work with the military while trying to manage reforms to placate the masses. The problem with democratic reforms is that they can potentially bring to power political forces that at the very least do not define their country’s national interest in line with U.S. strategic interests in the region. As it is, the United States is struggling to deal with an Iran empowered because of the collapse of the Baathist regime in Iraq.

At a time when Iran is projecting power across Mesopotamia and into the Levant, a less than stable Egypt will massively amplify the United States’ Middle East problems. Regime change in Egypt also has implications for the stability in other major countries in the region such as Israel, Syria, Jordan and Yemen. It is this gravity of the situation that would explain why Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal on Wednesday issued a very odd statement in which he expressed a lack of confidence in the ability of the Egyptian state to handle the public uprising.

The United States and much of the rest of the world will be watching how the Egyptian government manages the protests, the military and the succession question. Thus, everything depends on whether or not there will be regime change in Egypt.

[SolkaTruesilver]

In short, It's essential an excuse for me to start a thread regarding the Middle-East current revolutionary wave against their military secular regimes.

In "The Next Hundred Years", Friedman mentionned that the initial geopolitical plan of the jihadists was to overthrow these regimes to install Islamist Republics of the like of in Iran. The fear of the US was to see a serie of revolution that would result in successive regimes hostile to Israel and the US. The strategy has then been one of proactive shitmongering: attacking Iraq to increase chaos in the region, a focal point for Jihadists to act outside of their original countries of operation. It also served as an intensive for the secular regimes allied with the US to increase their clamping down on extremist islamist activities. Overall, the strategy worked.. maybe until now.

Now, we saw a regime fall overnight last week, and we are seeing probably one of the strongest arab military regime of the Middle-East being challenge on an unprecedented level. It is quite unsure if the Muslim Brotherhood are the ones who help focus this revolution, or if they are simply additional actors in the event without being prime movers.

If Mubarrak falls, do you think there shall be more of them?

If Mubarrak falls, do you think it will increase islamist activities in the middle-east, the way Pervez Musharraf's standing down in Pakistan increased the activity of the country's Islamist political faction?

[kostmayer]

Was sat talking about Egypt over dinner. I told my young coworker that news was hard to come by as Egypt had effectively been disconnected from the Internet.

He was still trying to get his head round the idea 2 hours later. Made me wonder what would happen if Global communications were suddenly turned off.

[Captain Seafort]

The fear of the US was to see a serie of revolution that would result in successive regimes hostile to Israel and the US. The strategy has then been one of proactive shitmongering: attacking Iraq to increase chaos in the region, a focal point for Jihadists to act outside of their original countries of operation. It also served as an intensive for the secular regimes allied with the US to increase their clamping down on extremist islamist activities. Overall, the strategy worked.. maybe until now.

What the fuck are you waffling about? I can think of a few reasons behind the invasion off the top of my head, but deliberately acting as a jihadist magnet in the manner things eventually turned out is not one of them, especially given the complete lack of preparation to fight such a war. Not even the US government is that thick.

If Mubarrak falls, do you think there shall be more of them?

Further protests or further collapses? If it's the former then certainly - they're already happening. If the later, then it's impossible to say. It would certainly encourage the protesters, but given the unique nature of the situation in each country I would not directly link the fall of any one regime to the fall of another, with the sole exception of Tunisia due to to its role in providing the initial impetus. If any do go I'd expect it to be Yemen. We'll know a lot more in 12-24 hours.

the way Pervez Musharraf's standing down in Pakistan increased the activity of the country's Islamist political faction?

More unsupported assertions. Provide evidence that Musharraf's resignation was a key cause of the increased Islamist activity in Pakistan, especially given that the situation had been deteriorating for some time before then.

[SolkaTruesilver]

the way Pervez Musharraf's standing down in Pakistan increased the activity of the country's Islamist political faction?

More unsupported assertions. Provide evidence that Musharraf's resignation was a key cause of the increased Islamist activity in Pakistan, especially given that the situation had been deteriorating for some time before then.

Musharraf's retirement from the presidency wasn't directly linked, but it was the beginning of the withdrawal of the military from being the faction in power, opening the way to the civilian secular president that we have right now. However, this civilian government has been much less able to keep the islamist down than the military have been, one of the reason was shifting loyalties in Pakistan's intelligence agency (the kind of problem these new civilian government usually face).

the same kind of event could happen in Egypt and Tunisia. With the military establishment ousted from the top office, you could see a void filled by islamist militants, who are not a faction one should dismiss in these two countries.

[Captain Seafort]

Musharraf's retirement from the presidency wasn't directly linked, but it was the beginning of the withdrawal of the military from being the faction in power, opening the way to the civilian secular president that we have right now.

Bullshit. Musharraf's resignation was the completion of that process, which began with his retirement from the army, and continued with the elections in early '08.

However, this civilian government has been much less able to keep the islamist down than the military have been

While there's no disputing that things went downhill badly, especially in the first half of 2009 with the militant advances in Malakand, that progress was arrested and then reversed - things are now improving there (albeit slowly).

one of the reason was shifting loyalties in Pakistan's intelligence agency (the kind of problem these new civilian government usually face).

Source for this? While ISI are hardly the most trustworth bunch in the region, I'd heard nothing to suggest that they're deliberately undercutting the civilian government, and certainly not in the context of operations against a group that had a crack at army HQ.

[SolkaTruesilver]

Source for this? While ISI are hardly the most trustworth bunch in the region, I'd heard nothing to suggest that they're deliberately undercutting the civilian government, and certainly not in the context of operations against a group that had a crack at army HQ.

STRATFOR reports and other news source I gather. Most of them adressing the ISI show that they are much less likely to be proactive against the islamists in Pakistan now than they were while the militaries were the dominant faction. Thing is, they have used the islamists for so long as a power base, they don't want to start going against the people who are source of influence for them now that their previous power-brokers left the positions of authority.

But I haven't read anything saying they are deliberately going against the civilian government. Just that they are (were? maybe it changed in the past 6 months) giving a LOT of slack to the islamists, and these islamist are the ones undermining the government in the country.

[Captain Seafort]

STRATFOR reports and other news source I gather.

I asked for a source, not a lot of vague handwaving you evasive little shit. Provide those sources, now, or I will consider the point conceded.

Most of them adressing the ISI show that they are much less likely to be proactive against the islamists in Pakistan now than they were while the militaries were the dominant faction.

1) Evidence?

2) Why the fuck would ISI be giving the Pakistani Taliban an easy ride, given their demonstrable antipathy towards the Pakistani state?

Thing is, they have used the islamists for so long as a power base, they don't want to start going against the people who are source of influence for them now that their previous power-brokers left the positions of authority.

Power base? Do you ever think before you post? ISI have historically treated the various militant groups as tools, not a fucking power base.

Just that they are (were? maybe it changed in the past 6 months) giving a LOT of slack to the islamists, and these islamist are the ones undermining the government in the country.

Ah, so repeated offensives into the tribal areas are "giving a lot of slack" are they? Strange definition.

[Deepcrush]

Getting a little pissy today seafort?

[Captain Seafort]

Not much more than usual when this idiot shows up and starts spewing unsupported garbage as The Truth.

[Deepcrush]

Really? To me it seemed like his views followed by questions for a better understanding. While I'm not saying he's the brightest bulb, its also highly hypocritical on your part to lash someone for being on unfamiliar ground.

[Captain Seafort]

To me it seemed like his views followed by questions for a better understanding.

I don't have a problem with the questions - it's the bald statements around them that I have problems with.

its also highly hypocritical on your part to lash someone for being on unfamiliar ground.

Hardly. If I get involved in a debate on a subject I know little about I defer to those who know what they're talking about, as I have to you on occasion. I don't stride in declaring my opinions as facts without supporting evidence.

[Deepcrush]

Fair enough.

[Captain Picard's Hair]

Whatever's been going on there, their government has apparently shut off access to the internet from within Egypt (or internet access to Egypt from without). Evidently, as a fairly small country Egypt had a small number of ISPs and external connections which made this a lot easier than it would be for larger countries, though it probably still took a few hours to execute. But, this was a rather extreme reaction, probably intended to disrupt protesters' ability to coordinate but which seems likely to have unintended consequences. Plenty of revolts have taken place long before the concept of "internet" was extant. In short, it seems like a sign of panic.

[Mikey]

No more a sign of panic than Mubarak publicly promising to completely revamp the look of the government by morning.