On the utility of carriers

[Captain Seafort]

#1 - The P-51 had a ready alternative to easily fix the power problem - Packard's Rolls Royce license.

And the B-70 had an easy solution to its problems - build it properly. AV-1, the airframe that most sources of the B-70's capabilities are based on, was junk, mainly due to a duff batch of materials. The point stands that dismissing an aircraft based purely on an early prototype is ludicrous.

At least as high, almost as fast; but far larger, hotter, and reflective = "more accessible target." Since when? Since logic and common sense.

Being able to see it, contrary to the old saying, does not equal being able to hit it if the missile can't reach it, or can't react to manoeuvres fast enough. It takes a long time to reach 80k+ ft, long enough for a bomber manoeuvering at Mach 3+ and 3G+ to get out of the way.

Fair enough, I'll give you that. As I mentioned, however, being able to fill its purpose for a couple of years isn't good enough to continue the project.

Being able to it for decades, on the other hand, is another matter - I repeat the point that the Soviets never came close to killing an SR-71. I've heard it said that the system doesn't exist even today that could kill the B-70. While this is, obviously, as a result of several decades of missile development that wasn't focused on killing high and fast bombers, it does give some idea of just how good the B-70 was.

[Mikey]

And the B-70 had an easy solution to its problems - build it properly. AV-1, the airframe that most sources of the B-70's capabilities are based on, was junk, mainly due to a duff batch of materials. The point stands that dismissing an aircraft based purely on an early prototype is ludicrous.

What you're talking about isn't fixing or adjusting the XB-70, it's building an entirely different strategic bomber as an alternate to the XB-70 - a solution, perhaps, but one which is outside the scope of this discussion.

Being able to see it, contrary to the old saying, does not equal being able to hit it if the missile can't reach it, or can't react to manoeuvres fast enough. It takes a long time to reach 80k+ ft, long enough for a bomber manoeuvering at Mach 3+ and 3G+ to get out of the way.

All fair points, but so fucking what? This was directly in response to your inquiry of my reasoning behind saying that the B-70 would have been a more accessible target than the SR-71. "More" is a modifier that speaks to relative terms. I never said it would be an "easy" target for early-1960's SAM systems, I said it would be an easier one than the SR-71 - then, when you asked, I explained why. The above quote regards what I said while disregarding your own question which prompted what I said, and therefore seems rather tangential.

Being able to it for decades, on the other hand, is another matter - I repeat the point that the Soviets never came close to killing an SR-71.

You can repeat it all you like, but it's already been addressed and dismissed. The fact that a contemporary plane with the same ceiling and a top end Mach 0.3 faster didn't get hit by a contemporary missile system doesn't in any way, shape, or form even hint that a SAM five to ten years more advanced - and forcibly evolved specifically to combat such a plane - wouldn't be able to hit such a target. In fact, it almost seems nonsensical to think that it wouldn't.

I've heard it said that the system doesn't exist even today that could kill the B-70. While this is, obviously, as a result of several decades of missile development that wasn't focused on killing high and fast bombers,

You just refuted your own point. As I stated much earlier and you just reiterated, SAM technology developed to the point at which attack aircraft design focused on low-level operations. Thus, SAM design followed suit.

it does give some idea of just how good the B-70 was.

No it doesn't - see above. The only thing of which this gives an idea is that people stopped making SAM's designed to kill things like the B-70.

[Captain Seafort]

What you're talking about isn't fixing or adjusting the XB-70, it's building an entirely different strategic bomber as an alternate to the XB-70

I''ve never spoken of the AV-1 or AV-2 XB70 - I've always spoken of the B-70, of which AV-1 and AV-2 were prototypes. I fail to see how you can describe the finished article as "an entirely different strategic bomber".

"More" is a modifier that speaks to relative terms. I never said it would be an "easy" target for early-1960's SAM systems, I said it would be an easier one than the SR-71 - then, when you asked, I explained why.

You're using the wrong parameters - seeing the thing wasn't the problem, with either aircraft. Reaching it and hitting it was the problem, and in that respect the relevant parameters are, at the very least, the same.

You can repeat it all you like, but it's already been addressed and dismissed. The fact that a contemporary plane with the same ceiling and a top end Mach 0.3 faster didn't get hit by a contemporary missile system doesn't in any way, shape, or form even hint that a SAM five to ten years more advanced - and forcibly evolved specifically to combat such a plane - wouldn't be able to hit such a target. In fact, it almost seems nonsensical to think that it wouldn't.

The "contemporary" SAMs that couldn't reach the SR-71 meant everything up to the mid-eighties. I fail to see how this equates to the "few years" you were talking about before. In any event, when the SAMs caught up the solution would be a B-70 replacement, just as the B-70 itself was intended to replace an aircraft that wasn't even in service when the initial requirement was issued.

I'm still a bit confused that this discussion is even going on, given that we both agreed that the manned bomber in inherently superior to the ICBM.

[Mikey]

I''ve never spoken of the AV-1 or AV-2 XB70 - I've always spoken of the B-70, of which AV-1 and AV-2 were prototypes. I fail to see how you can describe the finished article as "an entirely different strategic bomber".

WTF? You talked about a solution to airframe issues with the B-70 being to redesign the airframe... i.e., design an alternate aircraft. I'm the one who said that such a thing was outside the province of this discussion.

You're using the wrong parameters - seeing the thing wasn't the problem, with either aircraft. Reaching it and hitting it was the problem, and in that respect the relevant parameters are, at the very least, the same.

I'm doing nothing of the sort - I'll repeat, since you seem to tend to ignore everything that doesn't agree with you. The B-70 would've been slower than the SR-71, but for the sake of discussion let's let you assume that Mach 3.0 is just as good as 3.3 for evading S-75's armed with V-750's. Fine; the overarching point is that if the B-70 project were allowed to continue into production, then the S-75 within 5 - 10 years would inevitably have been equipped with V-753's, or V-755's, or whatever else the Soviets had developed which would have been more than capable of hitting a Mach 3.0 bomber flying at 80k feet. Great - at best, you now have a hugely expensive bomber project that you can use for something under a decade. I'm so sorry you're missing my joyous dance of celebration.

The "contemporary" SAMs that couldn't reach the SR-71 meant everything up to the mid-eighties. I fail to see how this equates to the "few years" you were talking about before. In any event, when the SAMs caught up the solution would be a B-70 replacement, just as the B-70 itself was intended to replace an aircraft that wasn't even in service when the initial requirement was issued.

You really don't read anything that differs from your own viewpoint, do you? As I said, no SAM research was continued on 80k+ feet interception ability because the extant tech meant a shift in the design paradigm to low-level-of-operation aircraft. That's why the F-11 was made, for example. Not ever having seen something that nobody ever tried to make isn't really proof of anything.

I'm still a bit confused that this discussion is even going on, given that we both agreed that the manned bomber in inherently superior to the ICBM.

Near as I can tell, you said that I had said that McNamara was correct on both the approaching availability of SAM tech that could be effective to 80k+ feet, AND that the ICBM rendered the strategic bomber obsolete. I went on to say that I never agreed with the latter, and then you tried to take me to task for agreeing with the former. I do agree that manned bombers are more flexible than ICBM's, but I also agree with the decision to shit-can the XB-70.

[Captain Seafort]

WTF? You talked about a solution to airframe issues with the B-70 being to redesign the airframe...

I never said anything about a redesign - I said the thing should be built properly as designed. The problems were specifically with AV-1.

I'm doing nothing of the sort - I'll repeat, since you seem to tend to ignore everything that doesn't agree with you. The B-70 would've been slower than the SR-71, but for the sake of discussion let's let you assume that Mach 3.0 is just as good as 3.3 for evading S-75's armed with V-750's. Fine; the overarching point is that if the B-70 project were allowed to continue into production, then the S-75 within 5 - 10 years would inevitably have been equipped with V-753's, or V-755's, or whatever else the Soviets had developed which would have been more than capable of hitting a Mach 3.0 bomber flying at 80k feet.

Which part of "they never got close" are you incapable of understanding? No Soviet missile produced up to the mid-80s ever came anywhere close to the SR-71. Do you seriously think the Soviets would have shrugged and ignored the fact that it was cruising about over their heads? Yes, with the B-70 in service they would probably have developed something that could kill it, but the solution to that is a B-70 replacement that can fly higher and faster still.

Great - at best, you now have a hugely expensive bomber project that you can use for something under a decade.

Great indeed. The B-29 was in front-line service 1944 - 1953, the B-36 1948 - 1956, the B-47 1951-1963, and the B-52 and B-58 from 1955 and 1960 respectively to their intended replacement by the B-70 in the mid-60s. If the B-70 had lasted a decade as a front-line aircraft it would have done very well indeed.

You really don't read anything that differs from your own viewpoint, do you? As I said, no SAM research was continued on 80k+ feet interception ability because the extant tech meant a shift in the design paradigm to low-level-of-operation aircraft.

No, the fact that McNamara was anti-bomber due to being an idiot meant that bomber-centric deterrence was abandoned. The mythical abilities of non-existent B-70 killers were just that - myths.

I do agree that manned bombers are more flexible than ICBM's

[/quote]

It's more than just flexibility - it's the complete lack of reliance on fixed, vulnerable C2 centres. A bomber wing at failsafe is a more secure deterrent, more likely to get through enemy defences, than ICBMs that rely on such C2 centres and follow a predictable track.

[Mikey]

No Soviet missile produced up to the mid-80s ever came anywhere close to the SR-71. Do you seriously think the Soviets would have shrugged and ignored the fact that it was cruising about over their heads?

Like I said countless times, they never got close at that time - they didn't get close subsequent to, oh, say 1967 or so because they stopped trying because attack aircraft design trends began to favor aircraft built for low-level operations. It's not an indictment of anything at all in the history of ever to say that missiles were never achieved that nobody tried to make.

Yes, with the B-70 in service they would probably have developed something that could kill it, but the solution to that is a B-70 replacement that can fly higher and faster still.

So, your solution is to build a bomber with it's own imminent obsolescence in mind, and then plan a replacement which won't be designed until after it's needed. You should have worked in the Weinberger/Carlucci Pentagon.

Great indeed. The B-29 was in front-line service 1944 - 1953, the B-36 1948 - 1956, the B-47 1951-1963, and the B-52 and B-58 from 1955 and 1960 respectively to their intended replacement by the B-70 in the mid-60s. If the B-70 had lasted a decade as a front-line aircraft it would have done very well indeed.

The B-29 was designed and implemented during wartime; as to the rest, the same indictment as I've just made applies. Just because we made certain mistakes in the past doesn't make them any less of mistakes subsequently. And we did shit-can the B-70, and instead got an aircraft which began R&D in its earliest form 24 years prior, which had none of the proposed technology or capabilities of the B-70, and was inferior in every way on paper - and which has yet served admirably in its role (and many, many others) since 1955 and is expected to do so for another 20 years.

The mythical abilities of non-existent B-70 killers were just that - myths.

Chicken-or-egg fallacy - production/service B-70's were just as mythical as said B-70 killers.

it's the complete lack of reliance on fixed, vulnerable C2 centres. A bomber wing at failsafe is a more secure deterrent, more likely to get through enemy defences, than ICBMs that rely on such C2 centres and follow a predictable track.

Since AFAIK we don't keep anything near a full complement of bombers aloft at any given time anymore, this distinction is smaller than you suggest.

[Tholian_Avenger]

They would be entirely relevant, if there were any operational examples beyond the two XB-70's.
. . .
What you're talking about isn't fixing or adjusting the XB-70, it's building an entirely different strategic bomber

Two XB-70A prototypes were produced, AV1 and AV2. AV1 had difficulty with its new type of skin, they had to close off some of the fuel tanks due to leaks, and the engines were handicapped due to flaws. AV2 was shaping up nicely on lessons learned (until the accident). An XB-70B was planned in the form of AV3 based on additional lessons learned. AV3 was expected to have been the production model.

"It was gonna be" isn't worth one skinny rat's ass.

You deride a fictitious production model for the prototype's vulnerabilities to a fictitious threat. Why bother to launch an ICBM attack at the Soviet Union if their Moscow ABM could destroy some of the ICBMs?

At least as high, almost as fast; but far larger, hotter, and reflective = "more accessible target."

Killing one target is possible, but a coordinated attack benefits from numbers, air defense system integration difficulties, suppression of enemy air defenses, escorts (F-108 & F-12), active countermeasures, active aircraft defenses, and other things which a B-70 fleet could have had. The B-70s could also been armed with stand-off air launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads to make their job easier.

[Mikey]

An XB-70B was planned in the form of AV3 based on additional lessons learned. AV3 was expected to have been the production model.

Maybe, maybe not. Doesn't really change anything. Such an AV3, if it were ever even proposed, wouldn't have been able to handle the P&W's any more than the first two.

You deride a fictitious production model for the prototype's vulnerabilities to a fictitious threat.

No, I derided potential production models for the production model's probable vulnerability to a future threat - a vulnerability which the plane NOT having was its whole reason for being. You're close, though.

Why bother to launch an ICBM attack at the Soviet Union if their Moscow ABM could destroy some of the ICBMs?

Hmm, it's funny - I thought you said "some" of the ICBM's instead of "all," but in that case you'd have refuted your own example.

Killing one target is possible, but a coordinated attack benefits from numbers, air defense system integration difficulties, suppression of enemy air defenses, escorts (F-108 & F-12), active countermeasures, active aircraft defenses, and other things which a B-70 fleet could have had. The B-70s could also been armed with stand-off air launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads to make their job easier.

You could very well be right in all of this. However, it doesn't mean anything at all in any form to the point which you quoted and said it in response to. Seafort had asked what I meant about the relative merits as a target between the SR-71 and the B-70, and I explained. Nothing to do with incorrect assertions of how the B-70 would be flown and incorrect assertions of the type of support it would have, or anything of the sort. The XF-108 and YF-12, BTW, were both planned and designed (such as they were) as interceptors, not fighters (and certainly not as long-range escorts.)

[Mikey]

As I write that last response, I'm reminded of a couple of overarching truths which trump either of our viewpoints.

#1 - the reason the Buff was and is so successful compared to scrapped a/o failed designs such as the B-70 is simple: it was a bomber whose sole primary design directive was to drop bombs. The B-70 was ultimately doomed to failure, or at least an extremely limited lifespan, because it had a reason for being of dropping bombs while doing something else - in this case, evading current SAM tech. No matter what you're making, if you half-ass it in different directions, it won't be as good as it could be.

#2 - No matter what you think of McNamara's stated reasoning, in the final analysis he did most of what he did (scrap the XF-108 after nothing more than a wooden model and a radar design, scrap the B-70 project, et. al.) because of money. I'm not here to say whether that reasoning is right or wrong, but I will never believe otherwise than that behind all those decisions was the impetus of saving cash.

[Captain Seafort]

The B-70 was ultimately doomed to failure, or at least an extremely limited lifespan, because it had a reason for being of dropping bombs while doing something else

I assume you therefore believe that the B-17 and B-2 (for example) were both failures with an extremely limited lifespan, as they were also designed to drop bombs while doing something else - in the case of the former, it was to shoot down enemy aircraft attacking it, and in the latter it was to avoid detection by enemy radar.

Hmm, it's funny - I thought you said "some" of the ICBM's instead of "all," but in that case you'd have refuted your own example.

This from the idiot who's complaining about the B-70 on the grounds that it isn't completely invulnerable to any and all SAMs that have ever been or will ever be invented.

Like I said countless times, they never got close at that time - they didn't get close subsequent to, oh, say 1967 or so because they stopped trying because attack aircraft design trends began to favor aircraft built for low-level operations. It's not an indictment of anything at all in the history of ever to say that missiles were never achieved that nobody tried to make.

And of course you have proof that the Russians didn't care about the SR-71 fights over their territory and could have whipped up a B-70 killer in five seconds flat if they wanted to.

The B-29 was designed and implemented during wartime; as to the rest, the same indictment as I've just made applies. Just because we made certain mistakes in the past doesn't make them any less of mistakes subsequently.

What mistakes? The idea of putting a weapons system into service in the sure knowledge that it will become obsolete, possibly very rapidly, isn't a "mistake", it's a basic fact of military procurement.

instead got an aircraft which began R&D in its earliest form 24 years prior, which had none of the proposed technology or capabilities of the B-70, and was inferior in every way on paper - and which has yet served admirably in its role (and many, many others) since 1955 and is expected to do so for another 20 years.

The B-52 was obsolete in its designed role by the mid-60s - the fact that it's proven successful in other roles doesn't change that. Rather than follow the logical course of action, to replace it with the B-70, McNarama decided to put all his eggs in the ICBM basket, which we've both agreed earlier in the thread are inferior to bombers.

[Mikey]

I assume you therefore believe that the B-17 and B-2 (for example) were both failures with an extremely limited lifespan, as they were also designed to drop bombs while doing something else - in the case of the former, it was to shoot down enemy aircraft attacking it, and in the latter it was to avoid detection by enemy radar.

The B-17 wasn't armed in the same type or degree in its initial form as it was in later incarnations; that said, it was not designed as an anti-fighter aircraft that also happened to have a bomb bay, nor was the B-2 designed as an anti-radar aircraft that similarly had an accidental bomb bay. The B-17's success, as I'm sure you know full well but are ignoring to try and make a point, came not from its armament but from its durability and survivability. Finally, yes! The B-17 had a run as a service aircraft - including usage by both the USAAF and the USN in it's -W form - of all of four years. Post-war usage as a raft dropper and by Air America doesn't really add anything in terms of this discussion.

This from the idiot who's complaining about the B-70 on the grounds that it isn't completely invulnerable to any and all SAMs that have ever been or will ever be invented.

And this from the thickhead who claims that invulnerability to near-future SAM's isn't important for an aircraft whose stated purpose is to be invulnerable to those SAM's.

And of course you have proof that the Russians didn't care about the SR-71 fights over their territory and could have whipped up a B-70 killer in five seconds flat if they wanted to.

I've already handily dismissed your usage of the Blackbird example as tangential at best; of course, your M.O. is to ignore any statements which have the temerity to run contrary to your own line of thinking. Further, I need no proof that the Russians "could have whipped up a B-70 killer in five seconds flat if they wanted to," because I never made such a claim - again, ignoring what you don't like in other peoples' opinions doesn't make those opinions go away. However, I likewise need no proof that the Dvina would have easily become a system effective past 90k feet - especially with development of the V-755 - had the B-70 become a reality... it's simple common sense, as evidence by the subsequent paradigm in all of military aircraft design after that point, a paradigm which was directly caused by the possibility of near-future SAM capability. You seem to do all this research and have a wealth of book-knowledge, but somehow I seem to have to repeat myself more to you than I do to my three-year-old.

What mistakes? The idea of putting a weapons system into service in the sure knowledge that it will become obsolete, possibly very rapidly, isn't a "mistake", it's a basic fact of military procurement.

Really? Is that why HMS Warspite and her ilk were still your frontline cap ships in the World War after the one in which she achieved veteran status? That why you guys were using biplanes do drop torps in WWII? It's a sad fact that such design flaws exist, and exist often - but the fact that mistakes are common makes them no less of mistakes.

The B-52 was obsolete in its designed role by the mid-60s - the fact that it's proven successful in other roles doesn't change that.

To what conversation does this apply? Nobody ever said anything different. The fact that the Buff was able to survive by adopting so many other roles is a testament to its unspecialized and fundamentally sound design - EOS.

Rather than follow the logical course of action, to replace it with the B-70, McNarama decided to put all his eggs in the ICBM basket, which we've both agreed earlier in the thread are inferior to bombers.

You're so close. The logical course of action would have been to develop a more useful and generalized strategic bomber than the B-70, not to replace the Buff with something that couldn't replace it.

[Captain Seafort]

The B-17 wasn't armed in the same type or degree in its initial form as it was in later incarnations; that said, it was not designed as an anti-fighter aircraft that also happened to have a bomb bay, nor was the B-2 designed as an anti-radar aircraft that similarly had an accidental bomb bay.

And likewise, which I'd like to think you've got enough of a working brain to understand, the B-70 was not simply a missile dodger with a bomb bay as an afterthought.

The B-17 had a run as a service aircraft - including usage by both the USAAF and the USN in it's -W form - of all of four years.

Which, by your standards, makes it even more of a failure given how much you complain about rapid obsolescence.

And this from the thickhead who claims that invulnerability to near-future SAM's isn't important for an aircraft whose stated purpose is to be invulnerable to those SAM's.

"Invulnerability" was never a requirement, on the grounds that it's ridiculous to expect any weapons system to be invulnerable. What was intended was that it
be the hardest target it was possible to produce, and that it achieved. The fact that it was higher and faster than the aircraft that did prove to be effectively invulnerable to all extant, near future and not-so-near future SAMs simply shows how well they did the job.

I've already handily dismissed your usage of the Blackbird example as tangential at best

Tangential, of course, meaning that it rips your argument apart.

Further, I need no proof that the Russians "could have whipped up a B-70 killer in five seconds flat if they wanted to," because I never made such a claim - again

You've repeatedly claimed that there would be no point in the B-70 because a counter would be developed. Either you referred to a long-term programme to develop such a counter, which would obviously leave the B-70 unchallenged in the period prior to its introduction (i.e. what I've been suggesting), or you were talking about an extremely rapid development to render the B-70 obsolete from the start.

However, I likewise need no proof that the Dvina would have easily become a system effective past 90k feet - especially with development of the V-755 - had the B-70 become a reality... it's simple common sense, as evidence by the subsequent paradigm in all of military aircraft design after that point, a paradigm which was directly caused by the possibility of near-future SAM capability.

If it's so obvious then you should have any problem providing such proof, and that such a system would be effective against the B-70's successor, which would obviously be capable of 100k+ and Mach 5+.

Is that why HMS Warspite and her ilk were still your frontline cap ships in the World War after the one in which she achieved veteran status?

What are you talking about? Our frontline capital ships in WW2 were the Nelsons, Hood and, as they came into service, the KGVs.

That why you guys were using biplanes do drop torps in WWII?

They were state of the art at the time they came into service - the fact that they were able to keep soldiering on is more evidence of the skill of their pilots and the shit state of German warships than the quality of the Stringbag.

To what conversation does this apply? Nobody ever said anything different.

You claimed that the B-52 as "has yet served admirably in its role...since 1955". I was pointing out that it was removed from its designed role by the mid-60s due to being obsolete.

The logical course of action would have been to develop a more useful and generalized strategic bomber than the B-70, not to replace the Buff with something that couldn't replace it.

The requirement was to deliver nuclear ordnance to targets in the Soviet Union. Doing this required the delivery system not to be shot down. This requirement drove the performance characteristics of the B-70. QED.

[McAvoy]

I am just going to make a quick observation, if there was any non-frontlike battleship class in the Royal Navy it would have been the R class. Warspite, Valiant and Queen Elizabeth were all modernized and those only thing that was truly lacking was speed.

[Deepcrush]

That and the sense of how to use them.

[Mikey]

I was in the midst of a detailed point-by-point response, but for some reason my iPad is getting finicky about editing a draft. So, I've revised what I wanted to say to this: what-ev. I'm not going to buy what you're saying, and you are apparently going to continue to ignore the inconvenient parts of what I'm saying. We will both go on believing that we are right individually. If I didn't like and respect you, I wouldn't have continued this convo this long, so if you derive some validation from saying, "I won this argument," then by all means go right ahead. I don't, nor do I require it, so proceed at will.

BTW, I know I said I had little use for a tablet, but an iPad's awesome factor increases quite a bit when you get one for free.