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Deepcrush wrote:On a side note, the Sherman was a horrible tank.

Not in all aspects - it's overland speed was certainly more than adequate - but you're right, there's a reason it was referred to as the Zippo ("lights every time") or the Tommy-cooker.

Captain Seafort wrote:It got the job done though.

That it did, but at an high cost in lives and materials.

Captain Seafort wrote:The Battle of the Pacific doesn't get anything like the recognition it should get - against a less loony enemy it could have won the war on its own.

Against a less loony enemy it wouldn't have gone near as well for the US as it did. The amateur nature of the IJN and IJA allowed the US to advance the war with far fewer casualties then one could expect. Even more so since the US had to maintain the offensive over such a long range under repeated island assaults and enemy counter attacks.

Mikey wrote:Not in all aspects - it's overland speed was certainly more than adequate - but you're right, there's a reason it was referred to as the Zippo ("lights every time") or the Tommy-cooker.

True, it had speed. But that was all it had sad to say.

Japan never stood a chance against the US regardless of their rather inferior battle tactics, equipment and so forth. Even if they had the best of everything from ships to guns to soliders, they would have just extended the war another year or two if the bomb wasn't dropped. At the very least make the whole island hopping campaign much more costly.

Many also forget that the British were there too but in a very junior role.

That Japanese had a few good things going into the war like the long lance and Zero. For the most part their ships were inferior to their equivilants. Guns were good decade or two or three behind as well. Their battle tactics sucked and would have made some sense 200 years ago.

The Kamikaze on the other hand isn't as bad as some say it is. The deployment of these flying bombs sucked though. One plane per ship is not a good plan since many ships especially battleships and carriers are large enough to withstand a single hit from a Kamikaze.

Deepcrush wrote:The amateur nature of the IJN and IJA allowed the US to advance the war with far fewer casualties then one could expect.

Amateur?! The IJN was probably the most highly trained and best equipped naval force in the world in 1941. They had problems of organisational culture at the higher levels (a very poor attitude towards ASW and their propensity towards overcomplicated operational plans) but at lower levels their surface forces and carrier pilots in particular were better than either the USN or the Royal Navy, as Pearl, the Indian Ocean raid and the actions off Guadalcanal demonstrated. Their problem was that they didn't have the resources, material or human, to match the US, and the heavy losses they sustained in 1942 (in which luck played a significant role, especially at Midway) were critical in breaking up the experienced pre-war carrier groups and forcing them to implement more and more abbreviated training for pilots flying more and more obsolete aircraft.

There was an element of ostrich-ness in their refusal to update certain materiel. Even if they didn't have the resources to armor their fighters, for example, they could easily have equipped the Zero-sen with things like self-sealing tanks if they hadn't steadfastly clung to a disproven idea of superiority simply because of the country of origin.

As to the "divine wind" attacks... the idea of kamikaze was as much a gesture of defiance and balm for the soul of a losing side as much as it was intended to be a viable form of attack. It was also an example of why the Japanese mindset wouldn't lend itself to surrender without an incredible loss of life.

Captain Seafort wrote:

Deepcrush wrote:The amateur nature of the IJN and IJA allowed the US to advance the war with far fewer casualties then one could expect.

Amateur?! The IJN was probably the most highly trained and best equipped naval force in the world in 1941. They had problems of organisational culture at the higher levels (a very poor attitude towards ASW and their propensity towards overcomplicated operational plans) but at lower levels their surface forces and carrier pilots in particular were better than either the USN or the Royal Navy, as Pearl, the Indian Ocean raid and the actions off Guadalcanal demonstrated. Their problem was that they didn't have the resources, material or human, to match the US, and the heavy losses they sustained in 1942 (in which luck played a significant role, especially at Midway) were critical in breaking up the experienced pre-war carrier groups and forcing them to implement more and more abbreviated training for pilots flying more and more obsolete aircraft.

You are correct is that regard. However there are examples like the Bonzai charge with the leading officer charging the enemy with a sword.

True, which is why I specified the IJN rather than the IJA, and for a lot more important reasons than their last-ditch charges. Never has the old saying about amateurs talking about strategy while professionals talk about logistics been more emphatically demonstrated.

True. It does seem that the IJN didn't suffer from ineptitude but more from lack of resources to keep with loses and developments from the US.

Though they did suffer from stupidity by not properly protecting their convoys.

McAvoy wrote:Though they did suffer from stupidity by not properly protecting their convoys.

Indeed. ASW apparently wasn't suitable employment for a samurai. You know you've got problems when an historical organisation displays less understanding of warfare than TNG-era Klingons.

Captain Seafort wrote:Amateur?!

Yes, amateur.

The attack on Pearl should have been followed up by troop landings.
IJN/IJA intel reports were twisted to reflect US losses at several times their true numbers.
Suicide tactics, while useful at times became the standard measure of combat because of the above reports.
Japanese combat training focused on the fatal of combat not the endurance of combat.
Over complicated weapon design.
Shells and casings untreated against moisture.

Japan, while having some good ideas and some good ideas, was still as a whole an amateur at modern warfare.

Deepcrush wrote:The attack on Pearl should have been followed up by troop landings.

Only if they wanted to throw away troops. They never had the sealift to get enough men ashore to capture the Hawaiian islands, and what little they did have was already committed to the strategic objective of the campaign - Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

IJN/IJA intel reports were twisted to reflect US losses at several times their true numbers.

Everyone overestimated enemy losses.

Suicide tactics, while useful at times became the standard measure of combat because of the above reports.

An indication of desperation and the national attitude towards surrender, not incompetence.

Japanese combat training focused on the fatal of combat not the endurance of combat.

Huh?

Over complicated weapon design.

Technical problems, not amateurism - the Germans had the same problem.

Shells and casings untreated against moisture.

Technical problems, not amateurism.

Deepcrush wrote:

Captain Seafort wrote:Amateur?!

Yes, amateur.

The attack on Pearl should have been followed up by troop landings.
IJN/IJA intel reports were twisted to reflect US losses at several times their true numbers.
Suicide tactics, while useful at times became the standard measure of combat because of the above reports.
Japanese combat training focused on the fatal of combat not the endurance of combat.
Over complicated weapon design.
Shells and casings untreated against moisture.

Japan, while having some good ideas and some good ideas, was still as a whole an amateur at modern warfare.

The goal of the Japanese in attacking Pearl Harbor was not to invade but deal a crippling blow and then somehow magically have the US give up on the war within six months. It was figured if the war confinued past six months, the US would recover and win the war through attrition. They failed in that the US carriers were not there and did not deal enough damage to cripple Pearl Harbor as a naval base.

Captain Seafort wrote:Only if they wanted to throw away troops. They never had the sealift to get enough men ashore to capture the Hawaiian islands, and what little they did have was already committed to the strategic objective of the campaign - Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

They should have ignored those until the US forces at Pearl were out of the picture. The IJN traded a long term victory for a series of short term ones. The landing of even four divisions would have changed the face of the war. Along with delaying their attacks against US targets until they had defeated their other remaining enemies in the Pacific theater.

Captain Seafort wrote:Everyone overestimated enemy losses.

Overestimate =/= purposefully changing numbers to please their high command.

Captain Seafort wrote:An indication of desperation and the national attitude towards surrender, not incompetence.

That desperation would have worked if their personnel had accurate information on the abilities of US defenses. That is a clear case of incompetence.

Captain Seafort wrote:Huh?

Combat training is focused in three areas. Endurance (the ability to bring your enemy to battle), Survival (the ability to survive that battle) and the Fatal (the acceptance of losses in the battle). The Japanese belief seems to center on the idea that all that was really needed was the willingness to die in battle.

Captain Seafort wrote:Technical problems, not amateurism - the Germans had the same problem.

The German weapons worked, which was the difference.

Shells and casings untreated against moisture.

Captain Seafort wrote:Technical problems, not amateurism.

Failure to treat your weapons for environment is an amateur issue. The US, UK, USSR and even the Philippian militias didn't suffer that problem.

Japan continually set their minds to battle in short term measures while ignoring long term problems. Japan failed to develop proper logistics, failed to identify their enemies and their abilities. All the while refusing to accept the changes needed for the war in which they were dealing vs the wars of their past. While a lot of military groups throughout history suffer this problem at the outset of war. The difference between being inexperienced vs amateur is the ability+desire to adapt. Japan had the ability, but refused because they believed that ego was all that is needed to win conflicts.

McAvoy wrote:The goal of the Japanese in attacking Pearl Harbor was not to invade but deal a crippling blow and then somehow magically have the US give up on the war within six months. It was figured if the war confinued past six months, the US would recover and win the war through attrition. They failed in that the US carriers were not there and did not deal enough damage to cripple Pearl Harbor as a naval base.

Yamamoto's six month promise was based on the idea that the IJN would defeat the US Pacific Fleet and that the IJA would take the Hawaiian Islands and deny the US a midranged center of operation. That they could bring the US to the peace table, make consessions to the US in terms of territory and trade rights. This was intended to keep the US from affecting Imperial Japan's remaining wars against China, UK, etc...

Deep's right about that. The Japanese weren't trying to attack the US and over-run it. Their goal was to give us enough of a bloody nose to get us to butt out of the Pacific and let them go about their Imperial ambitions unmolested.