DPRK shells inhabited S Korean island

[Tyyr]

I've read some speculation that some of the generals might have popped them off so that KJI's successor doesn't go all softie on them.

[Foxfyre]

I'm watching this very very closely.........as I'm stationed in Yokosuka.

[SolkaTruesilver]

I'm watching this very very closely.........as I'm stationed in Yokosuka.

Oh my. You might get to see a lot of action from afar if it heats up.

[SolkaTruesilver]

Deciphering North Korea's Provocations

North Korean artillery began shelling the island of Yeonpyeongdo in disputed waters Tuesday afternoon (local time). The island is occupied by South Korea and located in the West (Yellow) Sea south of the Northern Limit Line that South Korea claims as its territory, but north of the Military Demarcation Line that North Korea claims as its territory. Homes were destroyed and at least two South Korean soldiers were killed. South Korean artillery responded in kind, and South Korean F-16 fighter jets were scrambled.

Looking back, in 1968, North Korean commandoes staged an attack on the Blue House, the South Korean president's office and residence, in an assassination attempt against South Korean President Park Chung Hee. In 1983, North Korean special agents killed four members of the South Korean Cabinet on a visit to Myanmar, and in 1987 they caused an explosion on a South Korean airplane that killed 115 people. There were running gunbattles in the hills of South Korea in 1996 as Koreans pursued commandoes that had infiltrated the South via submarine. Even today, small arms fire and even artillery fire are routinely exchanged between the North and the South - particularly in the disputed waters west of the Demilitarized Zone. Naval skirmishes occurred there in 1999, 2002 and 2009, and it was in these same waters that the South Korean corvette ChonAn (772) sank in March.

The ChonAn sinking combined with the wider context really brings this recent incident into relief. Despite what Seoul and its allies consider to be irrefutable proof of Pyongyang's culpability in the sinking of the ChonAn, there was no meaningful reprisal against the North beyond posturing and rhetoric. Needless to say, international sanctions have not succeeded in chastening North Korea in recent years.

"The question is, what exactly is Pyongyang pushing for?"

History is rife with examples of sunken warships that either served as a pretext for war or were ignored in the name of larger geopolitical interests. But while the ChonAn sinking was not incomparable to other fatal incidents in North-South relations on the Korean Peninsula, it has certainly been a new low-water mark for the last decade. And historical precedent or not, it is generally worth taking note when one country does not respond to the aggression of another that has committed an overt act of war by sinking a ship and taking dozens of sailors' lives. Perhaps the most overt result of the ChonAn sinking other than some very serious internal retrospection regarding South Korea's military and its defense posture was the tension between the United States and South Korea over Washington's hesitancy to deploy an American aircraft carrier at Seoul's request as a demonstration of the strength and resolve of the alliance (due to Washington's sensitivity to Beijing's opposition).

Indeed, the subsequent compromise between Seoul and Washington was supposed to center on an enhanced schedule of military exercises over time - including both new exercises and the expansion of existing ones. Among these was supposed to be the Hoguk 2010 exercise that began Monday and included some 70,000 South Korean troops conducting maneuvers - including on the very island shelled by North Korea, Yeonpyeongdo - an annual exercise in which the United States has often participated. Yet American participation was withdrawn earlier in the month at effectively the last minute over a "scheduling conflict" - in reality once again likely due to American concerns about the broader regional dynamic, including China's and Japan's reaction (the drills would have involved U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa partaking in an amphibious invasion of a small island, which would have been somewhat provocative in the current tense atmosphere over island sovereignty in Northeast Asia). What's more, the United States has little interest in seeing conflict flare up between the North and the South, so its calculus may in fact be not only wider regional concerns but also specifically the tension on the Korean Peninsula. In other words, part of the American motivation to withdraw its participation in Hoguk 2010 may very well have been to avoid provoking North Korea, even at the expense of further disappointing its South Korean ally.

Even before the Hoguk 2010 withdrawal, the U.S. hesitancy had enormous impact on Seoul, which, in the South Korean mind, was refused immediate and unhesitating reinforcement by its most important ally at the worst possible moment because of other American interests in the region. The state of the alliance is still strong, and exercises at more convenient times can be expected. But the course of events in 2010 in terms of the American commitment to the alliance may well define South Korean strategic thinking for a decade.

For North Korea, on the other hand, it is hard to imagine a more successful course of events. It struck at its southern rival with impunity and, as a bonus, provoked potentially lasting tensions in the military alliance arrayed against it. The North also wants to avoid all-out war, so Pyongyang is not without its disincentives in terms of provoking Seoul. Note that North Korea's actions have been limited to disputed areas and of a nature that would be difficult to interpret as a prelude to a larger, broader military assault (one to which the South Korean military would be forced to respond). Instead Pyongyang appears to be calling attention to the disputed maritime border, at least in part a bid to emphasize the need for a peace treaty or some similar settlement that would resolve the disadvantageous status quo in the sea and give Pyongyang the assurances of non-aggression from the United States that it desires.

Yet Pyongyang enjoys a significant trump card - its "nuclear" option. By this, STRATFOR does not mean North Korea's fledgling nuclear program, which may or may not include workable atomic devices. We mean the legions of hardened conventional artillery positions within range of downtown Seoul and able to rain down sustained fire upon the South Korean capital, home to about 46 percent of the country's population and source of about 24 percent of its gross domestic product. Though North Korea's notoriously irrational behavior is actually deliberate, carefully cultivated and purposeful, Seoul is still an enormous thing to gamble with, and South Korea - and the United States, for that matter - can hardly be faulted for not wanting to gamble it on military reprisals in response to what amount to (admittedly lethal) shenanigans in outlying disputed areas.

The problem that has emerged for the United States and its allies is that "red lines" exist only if they are enforced, and both Iran and North Korea have become expert at pushing and stretching them as they see fit. Though (despite rhetoric and appearances) Pyongyang absolutely wants to avoid war, especially during the transition of power, it has now established considerable room to maneuver and push aggressively against its southern rival.

So, what exactly is Pyongyang pushing for? What does it seek to achieve through the exertion of this pressure? Is it still within the realm of its behavior throughout most of the past decade, in which provocations were intended to give it the upper hand in international negotiations, or is it now asking for something more? The North Korean regime has been extraordinarily deliberate and calculating, and one would think it remains so. But is this ability to calculate weakening as a result of the internal strains of the power transition, or other unseen factors? Finally, what is Pyongyang ultimately aiming at as it takes advantage of South Korea's inability to respond?

[Foxfyre]

Interesting article.

[SolkaTruesilver]

Probably the first analysis I have the chance to read that doesn't support the "KJI is crazy" theory.

STRATFOR usually evaluates things with the assumption that people at the top are a the top because they are rational and clever ennough to put themselves in that position. Sort of natural selection that prevents nuts to run a whole country.

[SolkaTruesilver]

U.S. Carrier Strike Group Embarks for the Yellow Sea


Summary
Just as both sides seemed to be nearing a resumption of talks, North Korea shelled South Korean positions on an island in disputed western waters, and a U.S. carrier strike group was dispatched to the Yellow Sea for exercises with South Korean forces. Since the sinking of the South Korean ChonAn in March, the United States had said it would deploy the USS George Washington to the Yellow Sea but had balked, in part because of objections from China. Now that North Korea has ratcheted up tensions again, Washington is sending a message to Beijing as well as Pyongyang: Rein in North Korea in order to better manage relations with the United States.

Analysis
U.S. Forces Korea announced Nov. 24 that the USS George Washington carrier strike group (CVN 73) left Yokohama, Japan, on Nov. 24 to join South Korean forces for naval exercises Nov. 28-Dec. 1 in the Yellow Sea/West Sea. The group includes the guided missile cruisers USS Cowpens (CG 63) and USS Shiloh (CG 67) as well as the guided missile destroyers USS Stethem (DDG 63) and USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), and it may also include a nuclear-powered attack submarine.

The announcement comes one day after North Korea fired artillery at Yeonpyeong Island, which lies in disputed waters off the west coast of the Korean Peninsula, killing two South Korean soldiers and two civilians and damaging property. The United States had previously committed to sending the carrier to participate in the Yellow Sea exercises as a show of strength following the March sinking of the ChonAn (772), a South Korean naval corvette, and had formally maintained its intention to do so in the months since.

But the United States wavered in part due to objections from China, which raised an outcry this summer about exercises so close to its political capital and heartland. Instead, the United States opted to send the carrier to participate in drills in the Sea of Japan, on the opposite side of the Korean Peninsula from China, and continually delayed posting the carrier group to the Yellow Sea. The U.S. hesitations gave rise to considerable doubt in South Korea about the American commitment to the alliance and drew attention across the region as the United States seemed to balk in response to China's bold diplomatic stand.


Military Drills and Six-Party Talks

Before the North Korean artillery attack on Nov. 23, the United States still seemed hesitant to undertake military drills with South Korea that could upset regional sensitivities. At essentially the last minute, Washington backed out of participating in South Korea's Hoguk Exercise, which began Nov. 21 and which North Korea blamed in part for its attack on Yeonpyeong Island. The exercise would have involved sending U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa, Japan, to stage a mock amphibious invasion of a small South Korean island, and while U.S. intentions were not clear, the United States may have resisted such a drill at a time when tensions throughout the region had intensified over island sovereignty. Japan was calling for a similar drill as a way to send a message to China over their island disputes (and holding amphibious exercises with South Korea may have obligated the United States to do the same with Japan, likely to the detriment of relations with China).

Also prior to the artillery attack, it seemed that all parties involved on the Korean Peninsula were moving closer to a resumption of international talks. China began campaigning to resume six-party talks on denuclearization back in September. Though the United States and its allies had not committed to new talks, setting a prerequisite that North Korea take "concrete steps" to show its sincerity, there were numerous diplomatic meetings between the players and an opening for inter-Korean negotiations. Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special envoy on the Korean nuclear issue, is currently on an Asian tour for just such a purpose. Even North Korea's revelation of its ongoing uranium enrichment activities to a visiting American scientist last week was a signal that talks could resume (the information was couched in North Korean comments that it was willing to trade away at least one of its nuclear programs, possibly both, if the United States would give it new assurances). And while the outcome would not likely have been the end of all North Korean nuclear activity, it may well have served to give momentum to a new round of talks.


The Yeonpyeongdo Attack

All of this was upended, however, when North Korea upped the ante by shelling Yeonpyeongdo. North Korea often springs a surprise on the world before negotiations, and over the past two decades this has been a fairly predictable method of winning initiative in talks. But the latest action, coupled with the ChonAn sinking, pushes the envelope further. It could still fall within the same rubric, with Pyongyang seeking to get a better position in negotiations or to insist that the United States join it in direct talks. But it also raises the question whether North Korea is trying to do something completely different or even whether it is losing a degree of internal control amid its ongoing power transition.

Either way, the United States has decided that it must now demonstrate to the world, without equivocation, that it is committed to its alliance with South Korea. This demonstration has begun by sending the George Washington to the region for exercises in the Yellow Sea, but it will undoubtedly involve other actions to bolster the alliance and the U.S. military presence in the region (for instance, the George Washington will also participate in annual exercises with the Japanese in December, which the Japanese still claim will focus on the theme of defending the islands against invasion, a veiled signal to China). This is not the first time the United States has sent carriers to the area for drills, but Beijing's resistance to the idea throughout the year has made it a more controversial action. Now the United States believes it must send the strike group to maintain credibility in the region, not only for South Korea but for its other allies as well, and to deter its opponents. It simply cannot afford to lose credibility by not supporting allies when they are attacked. Moreover, it cannot afford to be seen as backing down due to Chinese pressure.


China's Options

In particular, the United States is sending a message to China to rein in North Korea. China is by far the largest economic and military partner of North Korea, last year providing about 79 percent of the North's total foreign investment, 90 percent of its crude oil and 80 percent of its consumer goods. China also sells arms to North Korea and offers irreplaceable political and diplomatic assistance to Pyongyang for its confrontations with the outside world. China was able to stymie any attempt to force a meaningful response to the ChonAn incident, has shot down the idea of new U.N. sanctions, and has deflected pressure and criticism of the North Korean regime on numerous occasions.

But while China will bluster in reaction to the U.S. carrier exercises and other U.S. moves to solidify the alliance, there are limitations on its actions following North Korea's unpredictable attack. China will have difficulty plausibly denying North Korean culpability this time, as it managed to do with the ChonAn (where very little evidence was recovered from the wreckage, and China could get away with claiming the international investigation team was biased). However, China has already emphasized that the North Koreans claim their artillery barrage was a response to shells that landed in their territorial waters during South Korean military exercises, and Russia has said that military drills by South Korea and its allies (i.e., the United States) are destabilizing the region. Nevertheless, seeing that North Korea's actions will inevitably elicit a U.S. response, China has the option of demonstrating its sway over North Korea in order to work with the United States and retain some ability to shape the U.S. response. Otherwise it risks provoking the United States and losing control over when, where and how the United States decides to respond.

All of this comes at an awkward time, with both the United States and China striving to smooth over disagreements ahead of Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Washington in January. Because Beijing will have difficulty abetting Pyongyang in this latest incident, it may well become a test of Beijing's willingness to practice a bolder foreign policy in relation to the United States and other outside powers.

[SolkaTruesilver]

That's a somewhat mild response from the U.S., but at least, it's a response. The nonresponse from the US after the sinking of the ChonAn made Seoul cower, unable to assert itself against the NK aggression.

With any hope, China will be able to push and pull strings.

[Mikey]

I don't think this particular incident is a matter of "KJI is crazy," either. Rather, I tend to think that he's a bit more ill than he lets on, and having the country in a state of preparedness and paranoia - if not outright war - will tend to alleviate any opposition to Baby Kim taking over when the time comes.

[Sionnach Glic]

Aye, I've also heard it said that the apparent increase in provocational incidents this year could be due to the upcoming succession.

Personally, I'm not expecting KJU to take over easily. Once KJI dies I can see an attempted coup from some of the military's higher-ups happening.

[Mikey]

Exactly - a junta is less likely to take place if the military needs to focus on the current situation.