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They never managed to close Stanley for the duration, although the damage did cause the Argentines problems, and certainly scared the shit out of them given how much closer to Ascension Buenos Ares is.

I don't think they really expected to be able to close Stanley for the duration.

Black Buck was the modern Doolittle raid. It wasn't about doing real harm so much as showing them that they were vulnerable. And yeah, not just in the Falklands - if you can bomb them then you can bomb virtually anywhere in Argentina. It was about demonstrating resolve and giving them some sleepless nights, and in that it succeeded admirably.

GrahamKennedy wrote:It was about demonstrating resolve and giving them some sleepless nights, and in that it succeeded admirably.

Not quite as admirably as the navy did thirty two hours later though.

Heh. Been watching a lot of Falklands stuff on youtube lately. Somebody has pasted together a lot of news reports from the time into half hour chunks. It's really quite fascinating to watch interviews with military guys who are just back from bombing raids and such.

Example

GrahamKennedy wrote:Define "successful"? Their aim was to bomb the runway, and they did.

As in completing the mission.

GrahamKennedy wrote:I don't think they really expected to be able to close Stanley for the duration.

The very mission was to close off the air base, so its likely that they did expect to do better then they did.

GrahamKennedy wrote:Black Buck was the modern Doolittle raid. It wasn't about doing real harm so much as showing them that they were vulnerable. And yeah, not just in the Falklands - if you can bomb them then you can bomb virtually anywhere in Argentina. It was about demonstrating resolve and giving them some sleepless nights, and in that it succeeded admirably.

The Doolittle Raid was meant to piss off the Japanese, the Stanley raid was meant to close off an airfield. Doolittle succeeded, Stanley Raid didn't. They were nothing alike outside of the fact they both involved aircraft.

Oh? From wiki :

The purposes of the raid and its impact on the runway are also commonly misunderstood. British air power doctrine recognises that attacks against the operating surfaces of runways can have limited effect. Planning for the raid called for a bomb run in a 35° cut across the runway, with the aim of placing at least one bomb on the runway and possibly two. The main purpose in doing so was to prevent the use of the runway by fast jets, in this respect the raid was successful as the repair to the runway was botched and subsequently there were several near accidents. However, it was realised at the time that the runway would likely remain open to use by C-130s; the RAF routinely practises rough field take offs in their C-130s.

One bomb did indeed hit the runway. The runway was not used by fast jets.

So... what is a "wiki" quote that states nothing about a "Doolittle" style supposed to support at all with your statement that it was a Doolittle raid?

That was more aimed at your assertion that it was intended to close the runway. In terms of the other effects the article goes on to say

To the British, the raids achieved a number of non-material objectives. These included: demonstrating their willingness to defend British territories from forceful invasion, signalling British intent to recapture the Falklands and showing their ability to attack Argentine forces on the islands. It also demonstrated the possibility of escalating the conflict in future by striking industrial targets on the Argentine mainland. Regardless of whether or not the British actually intended to pursue these options and escalate the conflict, the Argentine leadership would have been fully aware of the implications.

Meaning it was also about the psychological effects. Showing them that we could hit them. Showing them that we were willing to hit them. You don't see the parallels to the Doolittle raid in that?

So the British attacks showed that the British intense to attack... Not a surprise of any kind. The Doolittle raid was sent to show Americans that we could reach Japan in return. An issue in doubt during WWII, not in the Falklands. The psychological effect of the Doolittle raid was based on the Japanese belief that their home islands were out of reach. Again, no one doubted that the RN could reach the Falklands. The Doolittle raid while a bombing run, had little care for the physical damage delivered as it was meant for a psychological gain. The Stanley raids were intended to take out an airfield. Fact remains that those attacks had nothing on the level of the Doolittle raid.

One raid, regardless of how someone on wiki tries to sugar a faulted effort, was to take out a runway. The other, with no serious intent of material damage, was sent to break a promise of an Emperor that their lands were untouchable. Booth involved planes, both involved people flying planes, and thats were the intentions parted ways.

Deepcrush wrote:So the British attacks showed that the British intense to attack... Not a surprise of any kind.

It was to the Argies - they thought we'd accept their occupation as a fait accompli.

The Doolittle raid was sent to show Americans that we could reach Japan in return. An issue in doubt during WWII, not in the Falklands.

On the contrary - Black Buck demonstrated that the Falklands were in range of land-based bombers. Quite a feat, given that the nearest base was 4000 miles away, and no air attack had ever been mounted over such a distance.

The Stanley raids were intended to take out an airfield.

As part of their objective. The other part was to demonstrate that we had the will and the capability to take the fight to the Argies, and if we could reach Stanley we could reach Buenos Ares.

As devil's advocate...

Captain Seafort wrote:demonstrate that we had the will and the capability to take the fight to the Argies

I'd call this objective only halfway satisfied. A true show of will and ability to take the fight on (or over) the Argentinian homeland would have produced more than an incompletely and very temporarily disabled runway. What was shown to the Argentines was that the RAF could, and would, put a couple of potholes in a runway that would still allow some planes to use the facility.

Mikey wrote:As devil's advocate...

Captain Seafort wrote:demonstrate that we had the will and the capability to take the fight to the Argies

I'd call this objective only halfway satisfied. A true show of will and ability to take the fight on (or over) the Argentinian homeland would have produced more than an incompletely and very temporarily disabled runway. What was shown to the Argentines was that the RAF could, and would, put a couple of potholes in a runway that would still allow some planes to use the facility.

Will is demonstrated either way. I remember those days - the task force spent weeks assembling and sailing down there, and during that time a great many people thought that it was largely for show. The Argentines only ever invaded because they thought we wouldn't fight for the islands in the first place. I don't know how they viewed the task force, but here it was commonly believed that we'd send it down and sail it around in circles for a while, then sign some sort of face saving compromise treaty and all go home again.

The Black Buck missions (and there were five, incidentally, not just one. With two more planned but scrubbed for weather reasons) showed that we meant business and that they had an actual shooting war on their hands. Most especially as the first one was followed the next day by the sinking of the Belgrano, at which point further negotiation was pretty much impossible.

I obviously don't have the sort of first-person viewpoint as you do; I can only imagine that if it were the U.S. involved and we said that "we're going to show them that we can - and will - take out an airbase near Buenos Aires," then I wouldn't have considered it a complete success unless we actually took out said airbase.

Mikey wrote:I obviously don't have the sort of first-person viewpoint as you do; I can only imagine that if it were the U.S. involved and we said that "we're going to show them that we can - and will - take out an airbase near Buenos Aires," then I wouldn't have considered it a complete success unless we actually took out said airbase.

Given the obstacles that needed to be overcome, both in the planning and execution phases, I'd call getting there, getting everyone back, and putting the runway out of action (albeit temporarily) a success.

And, as Graham commented, we have another anniversary today. At 15:57 on 2 May 1982, Her Majesty's Submarine Conqueror fired a spread of three Mk 8 torpedoes at ARA General Belgrano. Two hit, and she sank a little over an hour later, with the loss of over 320 of her crew. Black Buck might not have been an unqualified success, but the sinking of the Belgrano certainly was - the Argentine surface fleet went back to port and stayed there for the duration.

Captain Seafort wrote:I'd call getting there, getting everyone back, and putting the runway out of action (albeit temporarily) a success.

The runway was only partially put out of commission, by your own explanation. However, if you like to score it, knock yourself out.

As to the Belgrano... that certainly achieved a goal. Pity that any of our victory celebrations in war generally have to revolve around a large-scale loss of life.