On Hyperpowers

[Deepcrush]

I need .75 seconds to kill a person with a blade or my hands.

Getting slow, old man?

Yeah I know... but its not like I do it anymore so it can't be helped. Maybe a deployment or two would be good for me.

[Captain Seafort]

Ain't bad. Central Asia (Khazak and other -istan countries) are more of Russia's backyard, and they hold no real permanent strategic value (the temporal strategic value right now is mainly centered around the supply line for your Afghan mission). Russia is, for now, trying to rein back these -istan countries back into the fold by proxy politics, but it's not like you have any interest of challenging them for other reason than you like to limit a continental power's influence.

All crap. Not only will the maintenance of a military presence in central Asia be vital as long as the Afghan government requires US support (which will be long after the withdrawal of combat forces), but the stans are also in the middle of the new great game between China, Russia and the US. Obviously this will be down to just China and Russia by the middle of the century, but that doesn't change the vital nature of the central position they hold.

Latin america is America's backyard, so no challenge there.

Other than the huge number of left-wing, populist, ant-US governments, of which the Venezuelans are the most prominent.

You are losing influence in Africa, but you are happy to let the Europeans getting their hands dirty there.

Huh?

Methink you have stronger feet as an Empire than Great Britain ever did.

Actually, us in mid 19th century and the US now are about the same - safe from any great power challenger, but vulnerable to regional challenges.

[Mikey]

Obviously this will be down to just China and Russia

Oh, I'd give us until 2075, at least.

Huh?

Heartily seconded. US involvement is still pretty strong - at least as strong as European involvement - in that area, and if "influence" can be measured, it certainly doesn't correlate positively to involvement in Africa.

[SolkaTruesilver]

Ain't bad. Central Asia (Khazak and other -istan countries) are more of Russia's backyard, and they hold no real permanent strategic value (the temporal strategic value right now is mainly centered around the supply line for your Afghan mission). Russia is, for now, trying to rein back these -istan countries back into the fold by proxy politics, but it's not like you have any interest of challenging them for other reason than you like to limit a continental power's influence.

All crap. Not only will the maintenance of a military presence in central Asia be vital as long as the Afghan government requires US support (which will be long after the withdrawal of combat forces), but the stans are also in the middle of the new great game between China, Russia and the US. Obviously this will be down to just China and Russia by the middle of the century, but that doesn't change the vital nature of the central position they hold.

But that's about it, we aren't sure how long the Afghan governent will require that support, or if said support might simply be replaced by a proxy - like Pakistan or Iran. The supply lines are not essential, they are merely convenient.

As for China, they have little interest in delving in any serious political game beyond the mountains making a natural border around their mainland. They want to secure Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and the Manchuria for their buffer region value. Anything beyond these would just be too costly, and they already have their loads of problem with Xinjiang and Tibet.

The US are temporary power players in Central Asia, but that's about it: temporary. Russia is both happy to see the US bloods itself dry over such a backwater location as Afghanistan (oh, the irony!!) but they also hate the influence the US are gaining in the region, which is why we have seen hardball being played during the summer, specially around the key strategic valley of the region (the name escapes me, but it's a valley that is the most important key of real estate between Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan and tajikistan), all sponsored by Russia.

Overall, Central Asia isn't really important for now, save for the Afghan situation. China is a lot more worried about its internal stability and its vulnetrability to sea powers and economic sanctions from the U.S. than they are about power games beyond the Himalayas.

[SolkaTruesilver]

Huh?

Heartily seconded. US involvement is still pretty strong - at least as strong as European involvement - in that area, and if "influence" can be measured, it certainly doesn't correlate positively to involvement in Africa.

I heartily withdraw my comment about Africa then. Which only further my claim that the U.S. is an hyperpower in term of geopolitics.

The thing is, ultimately, Imperial powers don't need to own piece of lands anymore to be a strong power. With the ease of communication, you can simply use proxy governments to do the job for you.

[SolkaTruesilver]

Fergana Valley!


Thanks Wikipedia.

[Captain Seafort]

But that's about it, we aren't sure how long the Afghan governent will require that support, or if said support might simply be replaced by a proxy - like Pakistan or Iran. The supply lines are not essential, they are merely convenient.

It's to prevent Iran or Pakistan adopting the role of key backing power to Afghanistan that the bases are needed - the former is hostile to the west in general and the US in particular and the latter's assessment of its core interests was what led to the rise of the Taliban in the mid-90s.

As for China, they have little interest in delving in any serious political game beyond the mountains making a natural border around their mainland.

On the contrary - they're expanding their influence pretty aggressively westwards through the SCO.

The US are temporary power players in Central Asia, but that's about it: temporary. Russia is both happy to see the US bloods itself dry over such a backwater location as Afghanistan (oh, the irony!!) but they also hate the influence the US are gaining in the region, which is why we have seen hardball being played during the summer, specially around the key strategic valley of the region (the name escapes me, but it's a valley that is the most important key of real estate between Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan and tajikistan), all sponsored by Russia.

I agree that the presence is temporary, but their withdrawal will be because they're forced out, not by choice.

Overall, Central Asia isn't really important for now, save for the Afghan situation. China is a lot more worried about its internal stability and its vulnetrability to sea powers and economic sanctions from the U.S. than they are about power games beyond the Himalayas.

Again, on the contrary. Power games by the Chinese in central and south Asia, among and south of the Himalayas, will be one of the defining features of the 21st century. That is, after all, where their two greatest long term rivals are. They've already started this process through the SCO and planned railway extensions from Tibet in Nepal and towards the eastern Sino-Indian border.

[SolkaTruesilver]

But that's about it, we aren't sure how long the Afghan governent will require that support, or if said support might simply be replaced by a proxy - like Pakistan or Iran. The supply lines are not essential, they are merely convenient.

It's to prevent Iran or Pakistan adopting the role of key backing power to Afghanistan that the bases are needed - the former is hostile to the west in general and the US in particular and the latter's assessment of its core interests was what led to the rise of the Taliban in the mid-90s.

As for China, they have little interest in delving in any serious political game beyond the mountains making a natural border around their mainland.

On the contrary - they're expanding their influence pretty aggressively westwards through the SCO.

[...]

Overall, Central Asia isn't really important for now, save for the Afghan situation. China is a lot more worried about its internal stability and its vulnetrability to sea powers and economic sanctions from the U.S. than they are about power games beyond the Himalayas.

Again, on the contrary. Power games by the Chinese in central and south Asia, among and south of the Himalayas, will be one of the defining features of the 21st century. That is, after all, where their two greatest long term rivals are. They've already started this process through the SCO and planned railway extensions from Tibet in Nepal and towards the eastern Sino-Indian border.

China is farming influence, not establishing itself. They are trying to expand their influence there because it's a "soft zone", a place where few people have much interest and it's easy to be the flavor or the month in the local politics (like the U.S. are). After all, the two big powers concerned with the region don't see the region as a big geopolitical treath the way Russia fears Eastern Europe. They are chains of mountains, very hard to pass with an invading army, and little treath can come from there.

China just have some spare change to flex its influence muscle there. They have little to gain by gaining token allies around this region. China seems to me to be the "backup patron" to the countries with too bad a reputation to do business with western powers, or countries that no one has any real stake into.

However, the key area, as you have pointed out, is the Tibetian/Nepalese/Buttan border between China and India. The two powers have been playing a game of proxy influence war in these three countries, but without putting much heart into it. India softlty supports the Tibetian political movements located in its borders, and China is supporting Maoist political parties in Nepal and Buttan to stir up trouble and maybe install a friendly regime over there.

But until one of the two power gets weakened significantly, the deadlock of the Himalayas won't be solved. They will rather try to upset each other's naval influence, without upseting too much the U.S. by being too strong in the american's private pond (the Pacific).

And as for "nor Iran or Pakistan will be the patron of Afghanistan", I wouldn't be so sure of that. Geopolitics sometimes have the tendency to surprise us with what appears to be the impossibe.

[Captain Seafort]

China is farming influence, not establishing itself. They are trying to expand their influence there because it's a "soft zone", a place where few people have much interest and it's easy to be the flavor or the month in the local politics (like the U.S. are). After all, the two big powers concerned with the region don't see the region as a big geopolitical treath the way Russia fears Eastern Europe. They are chains of mountains, very hard to pass with an invading army, and little treath can come from there.

China just have some spare change to flex its influence muscle there. They have little to gain by gaining token allies around this region. China seems to me to be the "backup patron" to the countries with too bad a reputation to do business with western powers, or countries that no one has any real stake into.

What the fuck is a "treath"? If you mean "threat", then the central position occupied by the stans is certainly a potential threat to both China and Russia, not through surface power but through air power. While ICBMs and intercontinental bombers certainly reduce the importance of having sovereign territory or basing rights close to your adversary, they cannot duplicate the advantage gained by having those bases in your adversary's strategic flank or rear. The Chinese realise this, and they are certainly not expanding their influence into the area merely to pass the time.

However, the key area, as you have pointed out, is the Tibetian/Nepalese/Buttan border between China and India. The two powers have been playing a game of proxy influence war in these three countries, but without putting much heart into it. India softlty supports the Tibetian political movements located in its borders, and China is supporting Maoist political parties in Nepal and Buttan to stir up trouble and maybe install a friendly regime over there.

The Chinese in particular are putting a lot of effort into wooing Nepal in particular, and the Indians are screaming blue murder about it. Not surprising, given that memories of the war are still pretty strong.

But until one of the two power gets weakened significantly, the deadlock of the Himalayas won't be solved. They will rather try to upset each other's naval influence, without upseting too much the U.S. by being too strong in the american's private pond (the Pacific).

The Indians are nowhere close being able to put a substantial standing presence in the Pacific, but the Chinese are getting very pushy on the fringes - the recent bust-up with the Japanese over their respective EEZs being a case in point.

And as for "nor Iran or Pakistan will be the patron of Afghanistan", I wouldn't be so sure of that.

Where on earth did you get that from? I explicitly pointed out that the US needed to retain that position to prevent Iran or Pakistan moving in.

[Mikey]

The thing is, ultimately, Imperial powers don't need to own piece of lands anymore to be a strong power. With the ease of communication, you can simply use proxy governments to do the job for you.

Then it's not an imperial power. You're blurring the distinction between an area under direct interdiction and a sphere of influence. Before the Boxer Rebellion, for example, many European powers had spheres of influence in China, but none had a controlling colonial or imperial interest.

[SolkaTruesilver]

The thing is, ultimately, Imperial powers don't need to own piece of lands anymore to be a strong power. With the ease of communication, you can simply use proxy governments to do the job for you.

Then it's not an imperial power. You're blurring the distinction between an area under direct interdiction and a sphere of influence. Before the Boxer Rebellion, for example, many European powers had spheres of influence in China, but none had a controlling colonial or imperial interest.

Yes, it's still can be considered an Imperial power. You are thinking too much like Colonial era, and not ennough like the Roman era.

Roman was still an imperial power when it did not had direct administration of provinces, mainly by its complex of influences around the world. Their markets would be open to Roman's traders, and conflicts that would negatively impact Rome's trade were frown upon.

What the f**k is a "treath"?

It's a spelling mistake.

[Mikey]

Under the Roman Empire, areas were either part of the Imperium - i.e., administered by a Roman governor - or an independent trading partner. Take Ptolemaic Egypt - probably the single greatest provider of cereals for Rome, but not actually a part of the Empire until after Actium and the installation of a Ptolemy who served as governor for Rome, rather than as pharaoh. The latter example of an independent partner is actually a perfect example of to what I was referring: an influenced concern rather than a governed one.

[SolkaTruesilver]

Under the Roman Empire, areas were either part of the Imperium - i.e., administered by a Roman governor - or an independent trading partner. Take Ptolemaic Egypt - probably the single greatest provider of cereals for Rome, but not actually a part of the Empire until after Actium and the installation of a Ptolemy who served as governor for Rome, rather than as pharaoh. The latter example of an independent partner is actually a perfect example of to what I was referring: an influenced concern rather than a governed one.

Off course. But said "influence" was still imperialist in nature. Meaning that the "influenced" state still owed some form of tribute, and was expected to shut up and do as Rome said. Effectively, a Client-state.

King Anthiocus IV wasn't a vassal of Rome, but he still pulled out from his Egypt conquest when Rome sent a single senator to tell him to get the f*** out. You can be a very powerful Empire with only a network of influence that you leverage to increase your own wealth and power.

That's about what an Empire is: a faction using it's neighbour's riches and capacity to further its own power, so they then can expand further and increase the powerbase, until you reach the inneficiency point where it's not worth gaining futher control, as the energy spent is bigger than the potential gains.

Using a system of Client-states and influence is, technically, more efficient on the local level, as you don't need to fight insurgency yourself. However, it exposes you to the desires and interests of your client-state, which you have to keep under your leash one way or another (either by giving it what it wants, or yanking back the chain by taking away something you provide).

The system of conquered dominions is easier, as you don't have to care too much about what the local government thinks. But you are stuck with keeping the paperwork running.

edit: The USA are clearly using a system of influence depending on its consumer base to secure the loyalty and cooperation of allies around the world. They managed build 25% of the world's productive capacity using that network of client-states, "friends", etc... all of it powering their military and trade network. Their relations are usually happy to provide what the U.S. needs as long as the U.S. keep it's trade negociation fair and open, which also simplifies a LOT the problem of what the local government wants.

On the other hand, in times of trouble such as right now, the lower consumer base means the US aren't satisfying your clients, which then face economic troubles in their turn. No system is perfect.

[Mikey]

Then it's an issue of semantics, as I'd call that network of influence independent of the actual empire.

[SolkaTruesilver]

Then it's an issue of semantics, as I'd call that network of influence independent of the actual empire.

I guess. I always defined an "Empire" as a system of a central power exploiting the resources of others to increase its own power. Wether or not it actually conquers the territory used is merely a question of the administrative structure of said Empire.