Obama Narrows Conditions In Which Nukes Will Be Used

[Sionnach Glic]

WASHINGTON - President Obama said Monday that he was revamping American nuclear strategy to substantially narrow the conditions under which the United States would use nuclear weapons.

But the president said in an interview that he was carving out an exception for "outliers like Iran and North Korea" that have violated or renounced the main treaty to halt nuclear proliferation.

Discussing his approach to nuclear security the day before formally releasing his new strategy, Mr. Obama described his policy as part of a broader effort to edge the world toward making nuclear weapons obsolete, and to create incentives for countries to give up any nuclear ambitions. To set an example, the new strategy renounces the development of any new nuclear weapons, overruling the initial position of his own defense secretary.

Mr. Obama's strategy is a sharp shift from those of his predecessors and seeks to revamp the nation's nuclear posture for a new age in which rogue states and terrorist organizations are greater threats than traditional powers like Russia and China.

It eliminates much of the ambiguity that has deliberately existed in American nuclear policy since the opening days of the cold war. For the first time, the United States is explicitly committing not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, even if they attacked the United States with biological or chemical weapons or launched a crippling cyberattack.

Those threats, Mr. Obama argued, could be deterred with "a series of graded options," a combination of old and new conventional weapons. "I'm going to preserve all the tools that are necessary in order to make sure that the American people are safe and secure," he said in the interview in the Oval Office.

White House officials said the new strategy would include the option of reconsidering the use of nuclear retaliation against a biological attack, if the development of such weapons reached a level that made the United States vulnerable to a devastating strike.

Mr. Obama's new strategy is bound to be controversial, both among conservatives who have warned against diluting the United States' most potent deterrent and among liberals who were hoping for a blanket statement that the country would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Mr. Obama argued for a slower course, saying, "We are going to want to make sure that we can continue to move towards less emphasis on nuclear weapons," and, he added, to "make sure that our conventional weapons capability is an effective deterrent in all but the most extreme circumstances."

The release of the new strategy, known as the Nuclear Posture Review, opens an intensive nine days of nuclear diplomacy geared toward reducing weapons. Mr. Obama plans to fly to Prague to sign a new arms-control agreement with Russia on Thursday and then next week will host 47 world leaders in Washington for a summit meeting on nuclear security.

The most immediate test of the new strategy is likely to be in dealing with Iran, which has defied the international community by developing a nuclear program that it insists is peaceful but that the United States and its allies say is a precursor to weapons. Asked about the escalating confrontation with Iran, Mr. Obama said he was now convinced that "the current course they're on would provide them with nuclear weapons capabilities," though he gave no timeline.

He dodged when asked whether he shared Israel's view that a "nuclear capable" Iran was as dangerous as one that actually possessed weapons.

"I'm not going to parse that right now," he said, sitting in his office as children played on the South Lawn of the White House at a daylong Easter egg roll. But he cited the example of North Korea, whose nuclear capabilities were unclear until it conducted a test in 2006, which it followed with a second shortly after Mr. Obama took office.

"I think it's safe to say that there was a time when North Korea was said to be simply a nuclear-capable state until it kicked out the I.A.E.A. and become a self-professed nuclear state," he said, referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency. "And so rather than splitting hairs on this, I think that the international community has a strong sense of what it means to pursue civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes versus a weaponizing capability."

Mr. Obama said he wanted a new United Nations sanctions resolution against Iran "that has bite," but he would not embrace the phrase "crippling sanctions" once used by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. And he acknowledged the limitations of United Nations action. "We're not naïve that any single set of sanctions automatically is going to change Iranian behavior," he said, adding "there's no light switch in this process."

In the year since Mr. Obama gave a speech in Prague declaring that he would shift the policy of the United States toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, his staff has been meeting - and arguing - over how to turn that commitment into a workable policy, without undermining the credibility of the country's nuclear deterrent.

The strategy to be released on Tuesday is months late, partly because Mr. Obama had to adjudicate among advisers who feared he was not changing American policy significantly enough, and those who feared that anything too precipitous could embolden potential adversaries. One senior official said that the new strategy was the product of 150 meetings, including 30 convened by the White House National Security Council, and that even then Mr. Obama had to step in to order rewrites.

He ended up with a document that differed considerably from the one President George W. Bush published in early 2002, just three months after the Sept. 11 attacks. Mr. Bush, too, argued for a post-cold-war rethinking of nuclear deterrence, reducing American reliance on those weapons.

But Mr. Bush's document also reserved the right to use nuclear weapons "to deter a wide range of threats," including banned chemical and biological weapons and large-scale conventional attacks. Mr. Obama's strategy abandons that option - except if the attack is by a nuclear state, or a nonsignatory or violator of the nonproliferation treaty.

The document to be released Tuesday after months of study led by the Defense Department will declare that "the fundamental role" of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks on the United States, allies or partners, a narrower presumption than the past. But Mr. Obama rejected the formulation sought by arms control advocates to declare that the "sole role" of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack.

There are five declared nuclear states - the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China. Three states with nuclear weapons have refused to sign - India, Pakistan and Israel - and North Korea renounced the treaty in 2003. Iran remains a signatory, but the United Nations Security Council has repeatedly found it in violation of its obligations, because it has hidden nuclear plants and refused to answer questions about evidence it was working on a warhead.

In shifting the nuclear deterrent toward combating proliferation and the sale or transfer of nuclear material to terrorists or nonnuclear states, Mr. Obama seized on language developed in the last years of the Bush administration. It had warned North Korea that it would be held "fully accountable" for any transfer of weapons or technology. But the next year, North Korea was caught aiding Syria in building a nuclear reactor but suffered no specific consequence.

Mr. Obama was asked whether the American failure to make North Korea pay a heavy price for the aid to Syria undercut Washington's credibility.

"I don't think countries around the world are interested in testing our credibility when it comes to these issues," he said. He said such activity would leave a country vulnerable to a nuclear strike, and added, "We take that very seriously because we think that set of threats present the most serious security challenge to the United States."

He indicated that he hoped to use this week's treaty signing with Russia as a stepping stone toward more ambitious reductions in nuclear arsenals down the road, but suggested that would have to extend beyond the old paradigm of Russian-American relations.

"We are going to pursue opportunities for further reductions in our nuclear posture, working in tandem with Russia but also working in tandem with NATO as a whole," he said.

An obvious such issue would be the estimated 200 tactical nuclear weapons the United States still has stationed in Western Europe. Russia has called for their removal, and there is growing interest among European nations in such a move as well. But Mr. Obama said he wanted to consult with NATO allies before making such a commitment.

The summit meeting that opens next week in Washington will bring together nearly four dozen world leaders, the largest such gathering by an American president since the founding of the United Nations 65 years ago. Mr. Obama said he hoped to use the session to lay down tangible commitments by individual countries toward his goal of securing the world's nuclear material so it does not fall into the hands of terrorists or dangerous states.

"Our expectation is not that there's just some vague, gauzy statement about us not wanting to see loose nuclear materials," he said. "We anticipate a communiqué that spells out very clearly, here's how we're going to achieve locking down all the nuclear materials over the next four years."

Not too sure it's a spectacularly good idea to say just how much you can be provoked before bringing out the big guns.

[Lighthawk]

Not too sure it's a spectacularly good idea to say just how much you can be provoked before bringing out the big guns.

Agreed. Saying "We won't nuke you even if you use biowarfare on us" is rather asking for it.

[Aaron]

Christ, this is a spectacularly bad idea.

[Sionnach Glic]

Well I'm not sure it's really asking for it (since no one's going to do it for the forseeable future), but it certainly seems a bad idea to say "you can do X and we won't retaliate with our most powerful weapons".

[Graham Kennedy]

Personally I think it's a good idea. Okay he's saying that if you launch an Anthrax attack on the US he won't nuke you. Fair enough... but he can still have a couple of hundred strategic bombers go and carpet bomb their way through your capital city a few dozen times over, and there's essentially nothing you can do to stop it. And that's just the start of what they could do if they really wanted to. Deterrence enough, I'd think.

[Aaron]

I'm going to laugh my ass off if this results in a future US government restarting a BC weapons program.

[Mikey]

I'm going to laugh my ass off if this results in a future US government restarting a BC weapons program.

Don't hold your breath (pun definitely intended.)

[Tyyr]

I really thought he was smarter than this.

1) Rouge states don't give a shit if the U.S. changes the rules it uses in employing them. India and Pakistan didn't give a flying fuck what the rest of the world was doing. They each wanted nukes because the other guy wanted nukes so they went and got themselves some nukes. And in comparison to a lot of the world they're a fairly reasonable pair.

2) Taking nukes off the table in the face of bio or chem attack is stupid. In fact it's all but saying that bio and chem weapons aren't considered weapons of mass destruction anymore. The big disincentive to using them on U.S. troops was always that we'd reply with our own WMD's, only trick was we'd be popping off nukes on your ass instead of gas.

3) Nuclear weapon designs have a self life. Like any mechanical system they have a set period of time in which they are capable of being used. Eventually things break and have to be replaced. Parts supplies don't last forever though. The bulk of our nuclear arsenal is already long in the tooth, not designing new ones will result in the reliability of said systems going to shit and eventually not being capable of being used at all.

[Tsukiyumi]

Here's a different take on the matter.

Again, when the facts are revealed, it turns out that this is a non-issue for us.

[Mikey]

OK, I'm a little ticked off. I just saw Sean Hannity's interview with Rush Limbaugh (yeah, an expanse of opinion in that room that runs the gamut from "A" to "A") and I know the GOP needs to start spinning things better, but lying to a public that knows better isn't the way to go. Basically, they said the same things as Tyyr's post above, even though those things don't really bear any resemblance to actuality.

These guys were going on about the same crap as Tyyr, stating that we're weakening our stance, rogue (not "rouge") states not caring about our changing posture, etc. However, the TRUTH is:
- The non-use of nukes described was stated explicitly to apply ONLY towards other members of the NPT.
- The non-use of nukes was stated explicitly to be subject to review at the time of any situation, and thoroughly written as to be malleable depending on the circumstance.

So, yeah, how many rogue states would this apply to? Surely, all the so-called "rogue states" from whom we fear nuke or bio-chem action are long-standing signees of the NPT, right?

[Tyyr]

- The non-use of nukes described was stated explicitly to apply ONLY towards other members of the NPT.

Not really seeing how that makes a difference. So someone who hasn't violated the NPT and gone after nukes can gas us and we won't reply in kind? And the point stands because a rogue state isn't going to care what we do. Dangling a promise in front of Iran that we won't nuke them if they don't try to get nukes isn't going to influence them in the least.

The non-use of nukes was stated explicitly to be subject to review at the time of any situation, and thoroughly written as to be malleable depending on the circumstance.

Such policies are always malleable and always should be. The point is that it establishes a base line. In this case the baseline has changed from, "Use WMDs on us and we'll use ours right back," to "Use WMD's on us and we'll think about it." Personally when it comes to WMD's I'd prefer the US's standing policy to be, "Employ them and we turn your country into a parking lot." It sends the appropriate message about whether or not we consider their use acceptable.

So, yeah, how many rogue states would this apply to? Surely, all the so-called "rogue states" from whom we fear nuke or bio-chem action are long-standing signees of the NPT, right?

Policies such as this apply to more than just one or two countries and for more than just this instant. Threats can appear quickly and from unlikely sources. Given that nearly every country in the world has signed the NPT and officially abides by it unless Israel, India, Pakistan, or North Korea get a real burr up their ass about something then this policy will apply to just about everyone else. No, I don't think Turkmenistan is going to gas us anytime soon but if you'd asked me in 1989 if we'd be fighting a war with Iraq in two years I probably would have said no. You don't always see things coming a mile a away. That's why you set policies like this, so you've got a benchmark in place on how to respond and a place to start from.

[Mikey]

So someone who hasn't violated the NPT and gone after nukes can gas us and we won't reply in kind? And the point stands because a rogue state isn't going to care what we do. Dangling a promise in front of Iran that we won't nuke them if they don't try to get nukes isn't going to influence them in the least.

Just like Hannity and Limbaugh's discourse. #1 - No, nothing about it states that we won't reply in kind. #2 - A rogue state didn't care what we do before this policy - this policy has nothing to do with that fact. And, to further your example, nations like Iran are the nations that are specifically excluded from this policy. It's not about non-violation of the NPT, it's about being signatory.

"Use WMD's on us and we'll think about it."

Shouldn't this sort of thing always be the subject of serious consideration rather than knee-jerk reaction?

Personally when it comes to WMD's I'd prefer the US's standing policy to be, "Employ them and we turn your country into a parking lot." It sends the appropriate message about whether or not we consider their use acceptable.

It also sends the message that makes the entirety of the rest of the world think that America is a dangerous, insane maverick.

unless Israel, India, Pakistan, or North Korea get a real burr up their ass about something then this policy will apply to just about everyone else.

Add Iran to that last, and what other nuclear-capable (Israel's still iffy, but they will be sooner or later) "rogue states" were you referring to?

[Tyyr]

#1 - No, nothing about it states that we won't reply in kind.

Except that the United States lacks the ability to reply in kind to biological attacks (ceased all development programs and destroyed all stocks in the early 70's and signed multiple treaties to that effect) or chemical attacks (program ceased in the early 90's, destruction of stocks scheduled for completion in 2012). It's been our policy to treat any WMD attack (Nuclear, bio

this policy has nothing to do with that fact.

And my statement has to due with the assumption (on my part) that this change is meant to make the world safer, or influence other nations, and that as such an olive branch it's pretty much useless.

Shouldn't this sort of thing always be the subject of serious consideration rather than knee-jerk reaction?

Yes, it should. However when it comes to statements such as these you're much better off starting out with, "Use WMD's and we'll nuke you," with an asterisk that we reserve the right to decide not to in extenuating circumstances, rather than the other way around. It's like when laws and the punishments for breaking them are stated. Do you state the minimum punishment with fine print saying it could be worse or do you state the maximum with fine print that it could be lesser? This isn't about making friends, this is about deterrence.

It also sends the message that makes the entirety of the rest of the world think that America is a dangerous, insane maverick.

I disagree. It sends the statement that using WMDs against the United States is something we won't tolerate. We're not saying, "look at us funny and we nuke you," we're saying that if someone chooses to employ weapons that pretty much the entire civilized world has agreed are abhorrent we will reply in kind. Does owning a gun and being willing to use it to defend your family make you a "dangerous, insane maverick"? No. Neither does possessing nuclear weapons and being willing to use them should someone decide to step over that line.

and what other nuclear-capable (Israel's still iffy, but they will be sooner or later) "rogue states" were you referring to?

You missed the entire point of that statement Mikey. Yes, the current "rogue" state's gallery is exempt from this policy but who's going to be a "rogue" in five years? Hell, who's going to be one in two or three? No one knows for sure. The previous policy worked just fine. Use WMD's on us and we reply in kind. Simple, to the point, didn't require a constantly evolving list of exceptions.

[Captain Seafort]

You missed the entire point of that statement Mikey. Yes, the current "rogue" state's gallery is exempt from this policy but who's going to be a "rogue" in five years? Hell, who's going to be one in two or three? No one knows for sure. The previous policy worked just fine. Use WMD's on us and we reply in kind. Simple, to the point, didn't require a constantly evolving list of exceptions.

Neither does this one. It doesn't give a list of countries the US will consider using nukes against, it gives a type of country - the nuclear weapon states, non-signatories to the NPT, and those that are ignoring the NPT. It also doesn't rule out flattening countries exempt from nuclear strikes the old-fashioned way.

I also object to your use of the term "WMD" to include chemical and bilogical weapons. Neither chemical nor biological weapons can be considered such because not only do they not destroy anything but people, they're not particularly good at that - they're difficult to deploy, affect a limited area, are usually non-persistent, and can be pretty easily countered. At worse they're area denial weapons, and then only against civilians.

[Tyyr]

Neither does this one. It doesn't give a list of countries the US will consider using nukes against, it gives a type of country - the nuclear weapon states, non-signatories to the NPT, and those that are ignoring the NPT. It also doesn't rule out flattening countries exempt from nuclear strikes the old-fashioned way.

I prefer the far less ambiguous former policy but I will concede that it's fairly clear. I'm not wild about the ignoring the NPT part because of potential ambiguity it can introduce. Ignoring it according to who? Regardless, I'll drop it.

I also object to your use of the term "WMD" to include chemical and bilogical weapons. Neither chemical nor biological weapons can be considered such because not only do they not destroy anything but people, they're not particularly good at that - they're difficult to deploy, affect a limited area, are usually non-persistent, and can be pretty easily countered. At worse they're area denial weapons, and then only against civilians.

Both Biological and Chemical weapons are considered WMDs by the US government and included in the definition of "weapon of mass destruction" the vast majority of the time.